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Abstract 
There is no honour among thieves. This aphorism concisely expresses why the leniency 
programmes in competition policy have become one of the most effective instruments in the 
fight against the cartels. In this work we describe the dissemination, evolution and effects of 
the aforementioned programmes in the two decades since its implementation around the 
world, paying special attention to what is being done at the European Union (EU) level and in 
Spain. The empirical regularities obtained from the descriptive analysis of leniency decisions 
adopted by the European Commission and by the Spanish Competition Authority provide 
relevant information about the effectiveness of their corresponding programmes, as well as 
information about the underlying reasons why companies, in this context, submit applications 
for sanction exemption or reductions in the penalty amount. We conclude that still there is 
scope to increase substantially the dissemination and implementation of the leniency 
programme in Spain, and if the reforms are handled correctly, the program is set to catch up 
and to be the main source of detecting and sanctioning of Spanish cartels in the next decade. 
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There is no honour among thieves.1 This aphorism summarizes the essence of the leniency 
programmes. This type of regulation generically allows members of a cartel to benefit from 
favourable treatment if they submit information and help the Authorities to dismantle it. 
The origin of these programmes is found in works like that of Maskin2 and in literature 
about game theory, although we can find many similarities with the leniency programmes 
applied to the Italian mafia (called leggi sui pentiti).3 The first steps in the field of payment 
exemptions were located in the United States around 1973, although it was not until 1993 
when the Justice Department adopted the US Corporate Leniency Program, whereby any company 
could receive the leniency benefits, even if the investigation had already begun provided that 
the Antitrust Division did not have sufficient evidence against that company. In Europe, the 
Commission adopted it in 1996, with modifications in 2002 and especially in 2006, to give a 
better harmonization to the EU regulations. Since then, the dissemination of this policy has 
been remarkable. 
In spite of differences in the way of applying this mechanism in different jurisdictions, 
it has become a destabilizing instrument for the cartels. The number of cases examined by the 
competition authorities has increased considerably, as a result of better cooperation between 
those authorities and whistle blowing companies. It is worth noticing that competition 
authorities around the world benefit from information and experience gained by other 
competition authorities. Close and effective cooperation and coordination between different 
competition authorities enhance the viability and effectiveness of their respective leniency 
programs. Therefore, it is very difficult at times to clearly distinguish which part of a particular 
leniency program’s success stems from its own merits or from the success of other programs. 
Accordingly in the last decades the progressive evolution and rapid dissemination of 
leniency programs all over the world can be explained by the fact that countries learn not only 
from their own experience but also from others. Currently, all the countries, which form the 
European Union, except for Malta, make use of this regulatory instrument; but the 
introduction of the national regulatory frameworks did not happen simultaneously. The 
pioneers in this field were Belgium in 1999, France, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ireland 
in 2001 and in 2002 Holland, the United Kingdom and Sweden; not only within the EU but 
also other countries around the world. Hence, we can find these types of programmes on all 
continents; Brazil, Canada and New Zealand being other countries which were first to 
introduce it in their antitrust policies4. 
Our paper describes the dissemination, evolution and effects of leniency programmes 
in the last two decades around the world, with special attention to the EU and Spain. 
Regarding the latter, we explain the temporal evolution of those programs and its main 
                                                        
1 Porter, R. 2005. Detecting collusion. Review of Industrial Organization, 26, 147-167, 150. This author did 
not refer to the leniency of a cartel by one of its components, but unilateral deviation by a firm towards 
prices somewhat lower than cartelised, thus seeking a higher profit through the increase in its residual 
demand. 
2 Maskin, E. 1977. Nash implementation and welfare optimality. Mimeo. MIT. 
3 Jiménez, J.L. 2005. Un análisis económico sobre la política de defensa de la competencia: aspectos 
microeconómicos, macroeconómicos e institucionales. Ph D. Thesis. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/2174; Section 625 of the Cossiga Act (1979), and 
section 304 of that cited Leggi sui pentiti (1982), included the possibility of a substantial reduction of the 
penalty in the event that terrorists cooperated with the police and judicial authorities. 
4 In all these countries, the leniency programme was introduced in 2000. 
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characteristics, not only by cases but also by leniency applicant´s behaviours. The data 
highlights what are the factors that drive the success of this program and the main challenges 
that face in the future.  
In order to do that, we analyse the decisions adopted within its respective leniency 
programmes by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority, named 
between 2007 and 2013 as Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC). It is important to note 
that, since 7 October 2013, the functions of the CNC were taken over by the new Spanish 
competiton authority and regulatory body called the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la 
Competencia (CNMC). Therefore, any reference to the defunct CNC shall refer since 2013 to 
the new CNMC. 
The content is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, the second section 
contains a brief literature review. The third one shows a review of the historical spread of 
leniency programmes in the different countries where they are currently in force. It also 
discusses in detail the stages through which the introduction of the leniency programme in the 
European Union has passed, as well as the peculiarities of the relatively more recent Spanish 
leniency programme. The fourth section describes some of the features that distinguish the 
decisions taken by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority in 
which the leniency programmes were applied. And then, discusses the impact of the 
introduction of leniency programmes on the perceived effectiveness of competition policy. 
The paper closes with a final concluding section. 
 
II. A brief literature review. 
Academic literature has examined the suitability and effectiveness of leniency programmes, 
both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretic perspective, the pioneering papers in this 
field are those by Motta and Polo5 and Spagnolo,6 as well as the advancements by Feess and 
Walzl,7 Motchenkova,8 Aubert and others,9 Chen and Harrington,10 Harrington11 and 
Hinloopen and Soetevent.12 They all have a common outcome: leniency programmes deter the 
creation and sustainability of the cartels through destabilizing them. Moreover, Aubert and 
others13 support the idea that leniency programmes would improve if they would use not only 
sanctions against firms but also rewards to individuals. 
                                                        
5 Motta, M. and Polo, M. 2003. Leniency programs and cartel prosecution. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 21, 347-379. 
6 Spagnolo, G., 2004. Divide et impera: Optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels (and organized 
crime), Mimeo. 
7 Feess, J. and Walzl, M. 2004. Self-reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal 
Teams. Economica, 71, 333-348. 
8 Motchenkova, E., 2004. The effects of leniency programs on the behavior of firms participating in cartel 
agreements. Mimeo. 
9 Aubert, C., Rey, P., Kovacic, W. 2006. The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 1241–1266. 
10 Chen, J. and Harrington Jr, J. E. 2007. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel 
Formation and the Cartel Price Path, en The Political Economy of Antitrust, V. Ghosal and J. Stennek, 
eds., Elsevier. 
11 Harrington Jr, J.E. 2008. Optimal corporate leniency programs. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 56 
(2), 215-246. 
12 Hinloopen, J. and Soetevent, A. R. 2008. Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency 
programs. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 607-616. 
13 Aubert and others (fn 9). 
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Nevertheless, Chen and Harrington14 and Harrington15 offer a somewhat more nuanced (or 
less enthusiastic) view of these programmes. They highlight that when leniency programmes 
are very generous, they can have perverse effects in the enforcement of competition policy, either 
by increasing the stability of the cartels, or by generating a sense of security in those cartel 
operated sectors if the authorities focused only on leniency investigations, and conversely 
reducing the ex officio proceedings. 
However, it is not clear whether the leniency programmes have effectively improved the 
detection and deterrence effects of cartel policy.16 The most important obstacle to evaluate the 
deterrence effect is obvious: what is the underlying number of non-discovered cartels in each 
economy?17 Despite the difficulties, Miller18 evaluates the US leniency experience and suggests 
a deterrence effect. Klein19 also points out a positive effect on deterrence. Borrell, Jiménez and 
García20 indirectly assessed the deterrence effect. García21 evaluate the EU leniency program 
and she concludes that the detection effects prevailed over the dissuasion effect. 
Empirical literature has also provided interesting results on this instrument of cartel detection, 
although with certain nuances.22 So, while Miller23 offers evidence about the effectiveness of 
the new definition of the U.S. leniency programme, Brenner24 and De25 show that the 
European Commission’s programme is not as effective in deterring and destabilizing the 
cartels. 
The papers by Borrell and Jiménez26 and especially Borrell, Jiménez and García27 have analysed 
the effectiveness of the design of competition policy and the effects that the introduction of 
leniency programmes has had on it, respectively. Both used international indicators about such 
effectiveness and showed that the introduction and continuous implementation of 
programmes considerably improve such performance indicators. 
In the case of Borrell, Jiménez and García,28 the authors identify and quantify the impact of 
leniency programmes on the effectiveness of competition policy perceived by entrepreneurs and 
business managers to be between 10 and 21 per cent. In addition, another relevant conclusion 
is that selection bias exists, since the adoption of such an instrument is highly dependent upon 
                                                        
14 Chen and Harrington (fn 10). 
15 Harrington (fn 11). 
16 García, C. 2014. Effect of European Leniency Program on cartel detection. Master Thesis. Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid. 
17 Ormosi, P. 2013. A tip of the icerberg? The probability of catching cartels. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 29(4), 549-566. 
18 Miller, N. H. 2009. Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement. American Economic Review, 99, 750-
768. 
19 Klein, G. 2010. Cartel destabilization and leniency programs – empirical evidence. ZEW discussion 
paper nº 10, 107. 
20 Borrell, J.R., Jiménez, J.L. and García, C. 2014. Evaluating antitrust leniency programs, Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics, 10(1), 107-136. 
21 García (fn 16). 
22 Zhou, J. 2011. New Evidence on the Efficacy of Leniency. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932473. 
23 Miller (fn 18). 
24 Brenner, S. 2009. An Empirical Study of The European Corporate Leniency Program. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(6), 639-45. 
25 De, O. 2010. Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels. International Journal 
of the Economics of Business, 17, 33-65. 
26 Borrell, J.R. and Jiménez J.L. 2008. The drivers of antitrust effectiveness. Hacienda Pública Española – 
Revista de Economía Pública, 185(2), 69-88. 
27 Borrell, Jiménez and García (fn 20). 
28 Id. 
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the availability or presence of certain objective variables such as the existence of high levels of 
income per capita or regional policy agreements. Finally, an interesting conclusion is that the 
introduction of the leniency programme further improves the effectiveness of the policy in 
countries with lower levels of effectiveness, so that the overall gain is even greater. 
 
III. Dissemination of leniency programmes 
As we discussed above, the introduction of the leniency programmes had their beginnings in 
the United States, effectively in 1993. Their apparent success to destabilize cartels and get 
evidence from them were the two fundamental premises why they were gradually incorporated 
into the competition rules in a large number of countries. 
If the entry of these programmes around the world is ordered chronologically we can see how 
the diffusion curve of the policy is S-shaped (see Figure 1). The European Commission 
established its own programme three years after the United States and was subsequently 
revised in 2002 and 2006. From there, it seems that the entry in force has not produced a 
remarkable chronological pattern by country, with Spain being among one of the latest to 
adopt it. 
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Figure 1. Temporal evolution of countries that have adopted leniency programmes 
 
Source: Borrell, Jiménez and García (2014). 
 
In less than two decades, most countries have introduced a leniency programme. Borrell, 
Jiménez and García29 use certain factors that explain the introduction of these programmes, 
such as the age of the competition policy, the income level of the country, the holding of 
elections in the country (which give reasons for following this policy change) and membership 
in regional agreements or the European Union, among others. These latter variables are 
perhaps the most important conditions for the introduction of the leniency programmes. 
Member states of economic integration agreements are often forced into reforms of antitrust 
enforcement.  
III.I. The EU leniency programme 
One of the most important initiatives taken by the European Commission for the detection 
and dismantling of cartels has been the introduction and continuous implementation of the 
leniency programme. The details and description of the leniency programme that has been 
followed over the years at an EU level have been collected in a series of notices made by the 
Commission at three different moments of time. 
The first leniency programme was developed in the Commission notice on immunity from fines and 
reduction of fines in cartel cases of July 18, 1996.30 This Leniency Notice established the conditions 
under which companies cooperating within the framework of an investigation could be 
exempt or granted a reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed. 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 OJ C 207, 18.7.1996. 
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This first leniency system was the object of numerous criticisms that highlighted possible 
problems that affected its effectiveness. However, it introduced some of the basic guidelines 
that would guide subsequent versions of the programme, such as the requirement for the 
cooperating company to cease its participation in the cartel, to maintain permanent and 
complete cooperation with the Commission or not have played a key role as instigator or 
exerting coercion on other companies for the development of the unlawful activity. 
It also establishes a scale in the potential benefit that a cooperating company would gain based 
on, primarily, the time when it furnishes the crucial information. In particular, the first 
company to provide relevant evidence was guaranteed at least a 75% reduction in the penalty 
if it did it before the Commission had initiated an investigation and between 50 and 75% if 
their contribution was after the start of the process. Finally, companies were assured a 
reduction of between 10 and 50% in the penalty by the fact of cooperating with the 
Commission. 
The first time this Notice was considered in a decision of the Commission and, therefore, the 
first time the leniency programme was applied in the European Union (hereafter, EU), was 
not until January 26, 1998, in case IV/35.814 – Alloy Surcharge,31 where reductions of 40% and 
10% were applied to the involved companies. Thereafter, this system was applied in a total of 
42 decisions of the European Commission, of which four are cases in which subsequent 
sentences of the European courts have required the Commission to conduct what is known as 
a re-adoption, a new resolution of the case with respect to the resolution initially stated. 
 
Figure 2. Number of decisions in which the 1996 leniency programme was applied 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculations 
 
The 1996 notice lacked many enforcement details. It was not clear enough what type of 
information was necessary to provide and, consequently, the amount of the reduction that a 
cooperating company was entitled to. This lack of detail granted discretional powers to the 
Commission at the time to adopt a decision. This could create legal uncertainty for those 
                                                        
31 This decision was the subject of a new adoption on December 20, 2006 in the case COMP/F/39234. 
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companies that decided to cooperate and it was a clear obstacle for the success of the 
programme.32 A review of the conditions applicable in the EU leniency programme was 
therefore necessary. 
On February 19, 2002 the Commission published a second Notice that incorporated significant 
changes to the procedure and specified requirements in the programme.33 In particular, the 
Commission clarified the conditions under which immunity from fines would be granted to 
the first company to provide evidence, accepting that this evidence could be presented in a 
hypothetical manner, and even opening the possibility that the ringleaders of the illegal activity 
benefit from the programme, provided that they had not coerced other companies to 
participate in the infringement. 
In the proceedings the first cooperator was called upon to immediately provide the evidence, 
and the Directorate-General for Competition had to send the company a written 
acknowledgement of its application, stating the date on which the company had provided 
evidence. Once the company had disclosed all evidence in their possession, the Commission 
could grant conditional immunity from paying fines, keeping the possibility of revoking the 
said immunity if the applicant did not comply with the requirements of the Commission in 
this Notice. 
Also, for those companies that did not meet the requirements to access full immunity and, 
therefore, opt to seek a reduction in the amount of the penalty, the Notice detailed what was 
understood to be the added value of the evidence provided by the companies, for their 
application to be admitted. 
The company applying for a reduction in the fine, as happened after the complete immunity 
request, would receive a written receipt of delivery and would establish a progressive decrease 
in the range of the reduction to which the company would be entitled according to whether it 
was the first (30% -50%), second (20% -30%) or thereafter (0-20%), to meet the requirements. 
However, despite a guaranteed reduction, the applicant did not know the exact amount of the 
reduction that would be applied until the Commission took its final decision in the 
proceedings. 
This second leniency programme was applied for the first time on October 20, 2005 in the 
European Commission's decision on case COMP/C.38.281/B.2 – Raw Tobacco - Italy where 
four Italian tobacco processors were sanctioned for colluding in setting the prices paid to 
producers and other intermediaries, as well as in setting the allocation of suppliers.34 Including 
                                                        
32 In this first stage, the Commission did not require the companies to have requested a reduction of the 
fine to apply the leniency programme, and often this decision was based on the assessment that the 
Commission made of the cooperation that the infringing companies would have realised. 
33 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2002/C 45/03), OJ C 
45, 19. 2. 2002. 
34 In this case, the market leader, Deltafina, filed an application for conditional immunity and, alternatively, 
a reduction in the amount of the penalty based on the evidence provided about the competition 
infringement. However, before the Commission carried out appropriate surprise inspections, this company 
informed the other participants that it had completed the application for immunity, making them aware of 
the existence of the investigation. Failure of the requirements of the Notice with reference to the 
maintenance of a strict confidentiality process eventually caused the company to lose all of its immunity 
options and reduction of the fine under the leniency programme. Just one year earlier, in the decision in 
case COMP/C.38.238.B.2 – Raw Tobacco - Spain, the Commission had sanctioned five Spanish tobacco 
processors. 
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this decision, the 2002 leniency program was implemented in 29 decisions of the European 
Commission.35 
 
Figure 3. Number of decisions in which the 2002 leniency programme was applied 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculations 
The last Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases has been in force 
since December 8, 2006.36 This review has sought to provide greater clarity and transparency 
in the requirements and procedures to follow in the leniency programme and thereby make 
the programme more attractive to potential cooperators. 
One of the changes introduced by this new programme has been that the evidence to be 
submitted to apply for immunity should enable the Commission to carry out a targeted 
inspection in connection with the alleged cartel, or to assess the existence of an infringement 
of Article 81 EC (now Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
TFEU) in connection with the alleged cartel. Furthermore, it adds the possibility that the 
company seeking to obtain immunity choose to initially request a marker, to reserve their 
place in the order of presentation, or precede to formally apply for immunity. 
Finally, an issue that may be reducing incentives for cartel members to cooperate with the 
Commission, is that this Notice provides that, once the final decision by the Commission is 
adopted, statements of companies applying for leniency become public, which stands as a 
disadvantage to those who cooperate, versus those who do not, in case of possible private 
actions for damages. 
The first decision in which the 2006 leniency programme was considered corresponds to case 
COMP/39.406 – Marine Hoses whose final decision was adopted on January 28, 2009. The 
Commission fined a number of marine hose producers for market sharing and price fixing. 
One company received full immunity from the sanction and another earned a 30% reduction, 
recognising its collaboration with the Commission for cartel detection. During the period 
2006 to 2012 the European Commission has applied the 2006 Notice, including this final 
example, in a total of 9 decisions. 
                                                        
35 In case COMP/39.168-PO/Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners the 1996 and 2002 Leniency Notices were 
applied. 
36 OJ C298, 8. 12. 2006 
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Figure 4. Number of decisions in which the 2006 leniency programme was applied 
(2006-2012) 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculations 
 
In short, as we can see in Figure 5, regardless of its possible defects, the first Notice of 1996 
was a clear boost in the detection and dismantling of cartels operating in the European 
Economic Area.37 
 
Figure 5. Number of sanction decisions in each EU leniency programme 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculations 
 
In fact, if we interpret the number of decisions as a proxy for the number of leniency 
applications that led to the detection and punishment of cartels in each of the 
programmes, and evaluate them in relative terms using comparable time periods when 
the programmes were valid,38 the data seems to suggest that the first two stages of the 
                                                        
37 In Figure 5 the four decisions that were subject to re-adoption by the European Commission are 
accounted for only once and take into account that two different Notices, 1996 and 2002, were considered 
in case COMP/39.168-PO/ Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners. 
38 The 1996 Leniency Notice was valid from July 1996 until February 2002. The 2002 Leniency Notice was 
valid from Frebruary 2002 until December 2006. The 2006 Leniency Notice has been valid since 
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EU leniency programme generated higher incentives for cooperation with the 
Commission, as if it were operating a kind of law of diminishing returns in the 
application of the leniency policy. 
However, Stephan39 notes that most cases that were decided using the first Leniency Notice 
were no longer active at the time and had been the subject of similar investigations by 
the United States Department of Justice. Therefore, according to this author, too much 
credit should not be given to the EU programme. In any case, in our opinion, it cannot 
be excluded that the lower number of decisions in the latter stage is precisely the 
deterrent effect desired by the EU competition policy. The progressive European 
Commission activity, by prosecuting and sanctioning more and more cartelists, would 
have most likely deterred the same and other undertakings from infringing the 
competition law thereafter. 
 
III.II. The Spanish leniency programme 
The introduction of the leniency programme in Spain is referred to in Articles 65 and 66 
of the Competition Act 15/2007 of July 3 (hereinafter, LDC). However, its effective 
implementation was not possible until February 28, 2008, the date on which Royal 
Decree 261/2008 came into force, and developed the provisions of LDC related to the 
leniency programme as set up in Articles 46 to 53 of the Act. 
Consequently, the adoption of the leniency programme in Spain may be considered 
somewhat late compared to what happened in other countries in the European context. 
However, this delay allowed the Spanish leniency programme to benefit from the 
experience gathered by other competition authorities in developing their programmes. 
Despite the relatively short period of enforcement, the results obtained from the 
moment the Spanish leniency programme came into force until today strongly point to a 
positive balance of its effectiveness in the fight against previously existing cartels. 
Although inspired by the EU, the Spanish leniency programme has some of its own 
characteristics. In some cases, these features give greater legal certainty for companies 
that decide to cooperate with the CNC, such as the more specific collaboration 
requirements demanded to the companies applying to obtain the fine exemption. 
However, this further clarification limits the ability of the programme to be applied to 
certain practices that are not defined as cartels in Spain while they surely qualify as such 
under EU enforcement.40 
In particular, the definition of cartel which contains the LDC, according to the very 
wording of this Act, appears to exclude some collusive practices.41 Specifically, the fourth 
                                                                                                                                                              
December 2006 to present day (although our analysis considers the period from December 2006 to 
December 2012). 
39 Stephan, A. 2009. An Empirical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice. Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics, 5(3), 537-561. 
40 Vidal, P. 2009. Programas español y comunitario de clemencia, en Los acuerdos horizontales entre 
empresas, S. Martínez Lage y A. Petitbó Juan (dir), Fundación Rafael del Pino, Marcial Pons; Gutiérrez, A. 
and Guerra, A. 2011. Primeras experiencias en la aplicación del programa de clemencia por parte de la 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, Actualidad jurídica Uría Menéndez, Nº. Extra 1, 135-141 
41 There is currently no official European definition of cartel. Indeed, the European Commission in its 
2011 Communication entitled Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements states that the cartel concept 
follows from the decisional practice of the Commission and the case law of the Courts of Justice of the 
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additional provision of the LDC states that for the purposes of this Act, cartel is taken to 
be any secret agreement between two or more competitors which has as their object any 
prices fixing, production or sales quotas, market sharing, including bid rigging, or import 
or export restrictions. Thus, infringements not consisting in any such practices (for 
instance, exchanges of information), or not resulting from secret agreements, would not 
fall under the legal cartel definition. 
However, in practice, the Spanish Competition Authority has not adhered to this strict 
definition as it is apparent from the CNC Council’s resolutions.42 Moreover, the Spanish 
authority also defined cartels in a wider fashion when issuing, on 19th June 2013, the 
Communication on the leniency programme.43 In that Communication, the Spanish 
Competition Authority extends the definition of cartel to cover other conducts that, 
although not expressly mentioned in the LDC, are drawn from the past decisional 
practice of its Council and the European Commission as well as from the case law of the 
EU and Spanish Courts of Justice. 
Indeed, there are a number of rulings by the Spanish Courts of Justice which confirm the 
CNC’s Council decisions and consequently its broader definition of cartels,44 but there 
are also other rulings which place limits on such broader definition.45 Recently, the 
judgements of the National High Court, of June 2014, have annulled the CNC’s Council 
decision in case S/0318/10, Exportación de sobres, precisely one of the decisions in which 
leniency programme was applied.46 According to these judgements, the conducts, which 
had been sanctioned by the Council, did not even constitute any anticompetitive practice. 
All of this undermines the effectiveness of the Spanish leniency programme because the 
programme is only applied in cartel cases, and the authorities very often differ on what is 
precisely meant by cartel. The lack of legal certainty and predictability in the application 
and consequences of the leniency programme clearly discourages potential leniency 
applicants. 
Turning to the specificity of the programme, another of the procedural differences of the 
Spanish leniency system versus that of the EU is the inability to perform the exemption 
request in hypothetical terms (as in the EU programme) and the absence of a general 
marker system to reserve the occupied position in compliance with the requirements that 
allow granting immunity fines.47 
                                                                                                                                                              
European Union. 
42 See, for instance, the resolutions in records S/0086/08 Peluquería professional and S/0185/09 Bombas de 
fluidos concerning exchanges of information. 
43 Communication of 19 de junio de 2013, from the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, regarding the 
Leniency Programme, BOE, num. 196, pages 60718-60734. 
44 See, for instance, Spanish National High Court’s judgements of 30 and 31 May 2013, 9 July 2013, 6 
November 2013, 27 December 2013 and 16 June 2014 in respect of appeals against case S/0185/09 
Bombas de fluidos. (Roj: SAN 2325/2013, SAN 2343/2013, SAN 3029/2013, SAN 4566/2013, SAN 
5775/2013, SAN 2839/2014). 
45 Several judgements of the Spanish Supreme Court have demonstrated that the characterization of a 
particular agreement as a cartel upheld by the CNC’s Council in the case 617/06 Cajas Vascas y Navarra 
was wrong because, among other reasons, such an agreement was not secret (Roj: STS 1732/2013, STS 
3505/2013, STS 5343/2013). 
46 See judgements of the National High Court, of 23, 25 and 27 June 2014 (Roj: SAN 2921/2014, SAN 
3207/2014, 3079/2014). 
47 Martín, E. and Pelayo, E. 2009. Reflexiones tras un año de vigencia del programa español de clemencia, 
Boletín Económico de ICE, 2975, 63-72. 
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In the Spanish system, according to Law 1/2002, of February 21, the regional 
competition authorities are also competent to apply the leniency programme, although a 
process has been established according to which before the exemption is granted the 
Spanish Competition Authority must be informed about the application and be supplied 
with all the relevant information for the process. To date no regional competition 
authority has implemented the leniency programme. 
We have to note that the Spanish Competition Authority maintains a constant effective 
collaboration and coordination not only with regional competition bodies but also with 
the European Commission and other national competition authorities. 
If we make an initial approach to the resolutions stated by the already defunct Council of 
the CNC, the first one to consider the leniency programme was in case S/0085/08 
Dentríficos48 and was adopted on December 10, 2009. However, this proceeding did not 
lead to any penalty since the infringement upon which the file was based had been time-
barred. Since then until present the Council has passed 17 resolutions on which the 
leniency programme has been applied (see Table 1).49 
 




10/12/2009 S/0085/08 DENTÍFRICOS 
21/01/2010 S/0084/08 FABRICANTES DE GEL 
28/07/2010 S/0091/08 VINOS FINOS DE JEREZ 
31/07/2010 S/0120/08 TRANSITARIOS 
02/03/2011 S/0086/08 PELUQUERÍA PROFESIONAL 
24/06/2011 S/0185/09 BOMBAS DE FLUIDOS 
10/11/2011 S/0241/10 NAVIERAS CEUTA-2 
02/12/2011 S/0251/10 ENVASES HORTOFRUTÍCOLAS 
23/02/2012 S/0244/10 NAVIERAS BALEARES 
02/08/2012 S/0287/10 POSTENSADO Y GEOTECNIA 
15/10/2012 S/0318/10 EXPORTACIÓN DE SOBRES 
07/11/2012 S/0331/11 NAVIERAS MARRUECOS 
21/11/2012 S/0317/10 MATERIAL DE ARCHIVO 
15/02/2013 S/0343/11 MANIPULADO DE PAPEL 
28/02/2013 S/0342/11 ESPUMA DE POLIURETANO 
25/03/2013 S/0316/10 SOBRES DE PAPEL 
23/05/2013 S/0303/10 DISTRIBUIDORES SANEAMIENTO 
Source: CNC and authors’ elaboration. 
                                                        
48 CNC, file S/0085/08 Dentríficos, resolution December 10, 2009. 
49 Act 1/2002, of February, 21, regarding Co-ordination of the State and Autonomous Communities’ 
Competences on Competition Protection. 
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IV. Effects and effectiveness of the leniency programme 
After describing the development in the number of cases in Europe and in Spain, this 
section is divided into two parts. In the first, we highlight some of the most relevant 
characteristics that are extracted from the study of the decisions of both the European 
Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority where the leniency programme was 
applied. 
In the second section, we highlight the main results obtained in measuring the impact of 
introducing the leniency programmes on the effectiveness of competition policy for a 
large sample of countries. 
 
IV.I. The EU and Spanish leniency programmes: some relevant features of their implementation 
In this first section we describe some of the main results that we have obtained from an 
analysis of the decisions adopted by the European Commission and the CNC in their 
respective leniency programmes. This analysis is based on a database compiled by the 
authors from the information available on the European Commission50 and CNC51 
websites. In particular, the 79 decisions that the European Commission published have 
been considered, of which 4 correspond to re-adoptions of previous decisions as well as 
the 17 resolutions that the CNC Council has issued thus far. 
a. Importance of the leniency programme in the activity of the EU and Spanish competition authorities 
As can be seen for the data provided in Table 2, the EU leniency programme has been 
an essential tool in the fight against the cartels. On average, the leniency programme was 
applied in 86% of the decisions sanctioning the cartels. If we assess the number of 
decisions in which the European Commission granted leniency, with respect to all 
antitrust and cartel decisions, these have never been below 27% per year and have 
represented, on average 47% of all decisions for the period 2001-2012. 
 




Table 2. Number of European Commission decisions that apply leniency 

















2001 9 10 90 17 53 
2002 9 10 90 12 75 
2003 4 5 80 15 27 
2004 5 6 83 18 28 
2005 5 5 100 10 50 
2006 6 7 86 13 46 
2007 8 8 100 14 57 
2008 7 7 100 14 50 
2009 5 6 83 11 45 
2010 7 7 100 14 50 
2011 4 4 100 8 50 
2012 4 5 80 11 36 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculations 
 
With respect to the Spanish leniency programme for the period 2010-2013, the CNC 
resolutions where the programme was applied represent, on average, almost 28% of the 
decisions on collusive behaviour and more than 24% of the total on restrictive practices 
(see Table 3). 
This lower percentage, in comparison with that seen for the European Commission, may 
be due to several reasons: firstly, as previously mentioned, the stricter definition of cartel 
that appears in the Spanish Competition Act, which restricts the anticompetitive 
practices to those which the Spanish leniency programme could be applied; secondly, the 
late implementation of the leniency programme in Spain, and hence the limited period of 
time elapsed to be able to compare its effects with those achieved in the EU; and lastly, 
greater availability of human and material resources in the EU to implement the leniency 
programme. 
Additionally, the entry into force, on 1 May 2004, of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty has meant that Member States courts and competition authorities 
become fully competent to deal with many competition cases which previously fell 
within the exclusive power of the European Commission. On the one hand, this 
devolution of power to the Member States competition authorities has resulted in the 
redistribution of their already scarce resources among a larger number of potential cases, 
while on the other hand, the European Commission has so far concentrated its efforts 
on cartels and a limited number of cases of abuse of dominance.52 
                                                        
52 We thank the suggestion made by one referee for this point. 
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Table 3. CNC sanctioning resolutions in anticompetitive practices 
Year 
Sanctioning resolutions 















(art. 1, 2 y 3 
LDC) 
(c) 
2008 0 - 8 - 13 
2009      0 (*) - 16 - 25 
2010 3 30 10 30 10 
2011 4 18 22 14 29 
2012 5 23 22 17 29 
     2013(**) 4 40 10 36 11 
Source: CNC and own calculations 
(*): In 2009 the leniency programme was applied to case S/0085/08 Dentrificos, but eventually the Council 
decided that the infringement had prescribed. 
(**) January 2013-June 2013. 
 
 
b. The proceedings and importance of the imposed fines 
The average duration of the proceedings initiated by the European Commission, namely 
from the start of the investigation until the adoption of the final decision, exceeds four 
years. By contrast, in the case of the CNC this duration was only slightly more than two 
years. 
The percentage of investigations initiated thanks to the filing of an immunity application 
and that concluded with a sanctioning decision reaches very high figures, above 66 % in 
the EU and 70 % in Spain. This highlights the decisive role that leniency policy plays in 
destabilising, detecting and dismantling cartels in the EU and in Spain. It is also noted 
that a significant percentage of investigations were initiated on the European 
Commission’s own initiative (24 %), compared with those initiated following a complaint 
(9.3 %). This difference is not so relevant when analysing the investigations conducted by 
the Spanish Competition Authority. As mentioned previously, this can be explained by 
the greater means available to the European Commission for investigating ex officio 
cartels in comparison with the Member States competition authorities, especially after the 
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force.53 
This table also shows that in more than 60% of the decisions where the leniency 
programme was applied, immunity in the payment of the fine was granted. Consequently, 
both the European Commission and the CNC can be considered as decidedly lenient 
authorities in their decisions. 
                                                        
53 However, all of these comparisons should be interpreted with caution given the still and recent small 
number of decisions in the context of Spain. 
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Table 4. Some characteristics of the decisions with leniency programme 
application 







































28 70.6 17.6 11.8 68.8 2,685,420.16 
Source: European Commission, CNC and own calculations. 
 
In light of the data on the average penalty per decision, table 4 shows a greater severity in 
the average penalties imposed by the European Commission, representing more than 
twelve times those of the Spanish authority. 
Nevertheless, these figures have to be considered taking into account the higher turnover 
of the companies fined by the European commission that develop their activity in a 
relevant market much wider than the Spanish one. 
The highest fine imposed by the European Commission corresponded to the company 
Le Company de Saint Gobain in case COMP/39.125 – Car glass54 that amounted to 896 
million euros. In the Spanish programme, the highest penalty was imposed against the 
company Compañia Transmediterránea S.A. in case S/0244/10 Navieras Baleares55, exceeding 
36 million euros. 
 
c. Characteristics of the sanctioned infringements 
The following table (Table 5) reveals certain peculiarities about the infringements where 
the leniency programme was applied by the competent authority. Firstly, a greater 
average length of the infringements punished by the Spanish authority is shown. This 
data can be explained by the fact that the majority of the cartels, penalised thanks to the 
leniency programme in Spain, had developed their illegal activity during a long period of 
time. This was particularly the case in the detection and punishment of the especially 
harmful paper envelope cartel resolved by the CNC Council in 2013.56 This cartel had 
been active for some 34 years. 
The average number of companies implicated in the offending conduct subject to 
sanction decisions by the European Commission (9.1 companies) and the CNC (10.5 
                                                        
54 European Commission Decision, COMP/39.125-Car Glass [2009] OJ C173/13. 
55 CNC, file S/0244/10 Navieras Baleares, resolution February 23, 2012. 
56 CNC, file S/0316/10 Sobres de papel, resolution March 25, 2013. 
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companies) is quite similar, although somewhat higher in those files resolved by the 
Spanish authority. 
Regarding the number of different countries to which the infringing undertakings 
belonged to, in the decisions by the European Commission it can be seen that on 
average it is equal to four. 
Finally, either the European Commission or the Spanish Competition Authority found 
that the infringements of competition laws consisted mainly of practices that included 
both market sharing and price fixing, representing the 37.3 % and the 41.2 %, 
respectively, of the total number of decisions in which the leniency programme was 
applied. The decisions in which the infringements were concerned only with price fixing, 
and did not involve any other practice, also represent a very significant percentage of the 
total number of decisions taken by the European Commission. 
The practice consisted in price fixing were to be found in most European Commission 
and Spanish authority sanctioned infringements (91.9 % and 88 %, respectively), 
following in importance by market sharing (61.3 % in EU and 64.8 % in Spain), the 
exchange of confidential or sensitive information (27.9 % in EU and 23.6 % in Spain), 
and finally limit production (5.3 % in EU and 23.6 % in Spain). 
The infringement sanctioned by the European Commission that consisted in all the 
mentioned anticompetitive practices corresponds to case COMP/39.437 – TV and 
computer monitor tubes57. In the context of the Spanish Competition Council, the 
infringement consisting in all mentioned anticompetitive practice was the case 
S/0091/08 VINOS FINOS DE JEREZ58. 
 
                                                        
57 European Commission Decision, COMP/39.437 – TV and computer monitor tubes [2012] OJ 
C303/13. 
58 CNC, file S/0091/08 VINOS FINOS DE JEREZ, resolution July 28, 2010. 
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Table 5. Some characteristics of the sanctioned infringements 



































86 9.1 4 24.0 6.7 1.3 12.0 1.3 37.3 13.3 2.7 1.3 
Spain 
(2008-6/2013) 
119 10.5 1 11.8 5.9 5.9 11.8 5.9 41.2 0 11.8 5.9 
*PF: Price Fixing, MS: Market Sharing and Customer Allocation, EI: Exchange of Information, LP: Limit Production (or capacity). 
Source: European Commission, CNC and authors’ calculations. 
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d. Discovering the leniency applicant 
A striking feature of the first companies to blow the whistle on the existence of a cartel 
in the various decisions made by the leniency authorities emerges from studying the 
position that these companies held in the relevant market as in the line of work by 
Marvao.59 
In general, it is observed that these companies held a significant position in their 
respective markets. Thus, of the first companies that collaborated in the framework of 
the EU leniency programme, 60.3% held first or second leading place in their respective 
market and with a somewhat lower figure of 47% in the Spanish programme. 
Contrary to what might be expected from the economic models of collusion that state 
that companies with lower shares would have a greater propensity to break a cartel,60 our 
results show that the existence of a leniency programme can change these incentives and 
make whistle blowing more attractive to companies with significant market share in the 
affected industries. 
Coming from the application of the European and Spanish competition rules and their 
corresponding systems of penalties, these findings are perhaps not surprising. The 
European Commission, and also the Spanish competition authority, applies a system 
whereby a fine is proportionate to the turnover of the legal person. Therefore, the higher 
its turnover, the higher the fine that the infringing company should pay if it is sanctioned, 
and cannot benefit from the leniency programme. Thus, the companies which are better 
positioned in the relevant market will have stronger incentives to claim the benefit of the 
leniency program in order to avoid or reduce more severe potential sanctions. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the leniency applications from these companies 
holding first or second leading place in their respective markets, were the ones that 
caused the initiation of the corresponding infringement procedure in more than 70 % of 
times. In other words, they decided to apply “voluntarily” for leniency. 
The fourth column of Table 6 shows the percentage of companies requesting immunity 
when there was still an active participation in the cartel, at least until that moment. The 
low rate seen for the EU programme confirms the conclusions reached by Stephan61 in 
his study of the decisions in which the 1996 Notice was applied; once a cartel is broken, 
the company that was an accomplice in the infringing behaviour again becomes an 
“enemy” in the market. Therefore, the leniency programme can also be used as a 
valuable tool to inflict damage to the, now, competitors to the cooperating companies. 
It has to be emphasised that many companies that participated in more than one cartel at 
the time of submitting the application for immunity chose to betray the different 
partners in their illegal activity in all of them at the same time. This was the case, for 
example, with Henkel Ibérica, S.A., subsidiary of the German group Henkel AG Co KgaA 
that, on the same day as the Spanish leniency programme came into force, submitted an 
application for immunity in many different cartels that were subsequently prosecuted in 
Spain: S/0085/08 Dentríficos, S/0084/08 Fabricantes de gel and S/0086/08 Peluquería 
professional.62 
                                                        
59 Marvao, C. 2013 Heterogeneity of Penalties and Private Information, mimeo. 
60 Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P. and Tirole, J. 2003. The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Final 
Report for DG Competition, European Commission, IDEI, Toulouse. 
61 Stephan (fn 39) 
62 CNC, file S/0085/08 Dentríficos, resolution December 10, 2009, file S/0084/08 Fabricantes de gel, 
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Additionally the Spanish group Unipapel, S.A. (currently Adveo Group International, S.A.) 
was the first to simultaneously blow the whistle, on September 14, 2010, regarding the 
existence of a number of cartels in which they were involved, as shown  in the 
resolutions of files S/0317/10 Material de archivo, S/0343/11 Manipulado de papel and 
S/0316/10 Sobres de papel.63 This same company applied again for leniency a little later, on 
November 30, 2010 to declare the existence of another cartel in which it was involved. 
This other cartel was sanctioned in the resolution of file S/0318/10 Exportación de sobres64. 
 
Table 6. Some relevant features of the first company requesting immunity or 
exception* 
 Position in relevant market   














18.8 31.2 18.8 31.2 47.1 
 
* The figures relating the relative position in the relevant market are based on the currently 
available information, and in particular on 68 out of 75 European Commission decisions and 
on 16 out of 17 Spanish Competition Authority decisions. 
Source: European Commission, CNC and authors’ calculations. 
 
The above data suggests that once a company breaks the pact of silence and let the 
authorities know about one of the cartels in which it is taking part, the whistle blower 
firm is losing all credibility to stay silent while participating in the others. Consequently, it 
is very likely that other firms would race to be the first in apply for leniency once the 
whistle blower has lost its reputation to stay silent.  
Besides, the fact that these cartels operated in the same or similar sectors adds to this 
breakdown in the mutual trust between accomplices of a crime, hence the probability of 
the CNC Investigation Department finding evidence of their participation in other 
cartels was very high. 
Finally, a number of comments can be made regarding the most common nationality for 
the first companies which applied for leniency and were granted immunity or reduction 
of the fines. Regarding the decisions adopted by the European Commission, 20.3% of 
the companies were German, followed by American national companies with 13.9%, and 
British and Japanese companies with 10.1%. If we look at the nationality of the 
infringing companies, or of the parent companies in the case of subsidiaries, in those 
                                                                                                                                                              
resolution January 1, 2010 and file S/0086/08 Peluquería professional, resolution March 2, 2011. 
63 CNC, file S/0317/10 Material de archivo, resolution November 21, 2012, file S/0343/11 Manipulado de 
papel, resolution February 15, 2013, and file S/0316/10 Sobres de papel, resolution March 25, 2013. 
64 CNC, file S/0318/10 Exportación de sobres, resolution October 15, 2012. 
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resolutions laid down by the CNC Council, 53% of the first companies to reveal the 
existence of the cartel and cooperate with the CNC were Spanish, following them in 
importance were companies whose parent was German with 18%. 
However, as Guzmán highlights,65 the leniency applications presented before the CNC 
relate to multinational or Spanish companies that operate at international level. 
According to this work, a possible explanation would be that most Spanish companies, 
whose activity is concentrated in Spain might not know about the existence of the 
programme, although it is considered more likely that it is due to the fear or suspicion 
motivated by the higher expected damage from possible retaliation that these companies 
would suffer if they blow the whistle on a competition infringement, given the few or 
non-existent alternatives to the restricted market where they operate. 
In any case, the significant presence of German companies in both analysed contexts 
may have different interpretations that are neither exclusive nor exhaustive: the greater 
weight of the German companies in the European markets, a greater strategic use of the 
leniency system on the part of these companies to damage competitors and partners in 
the same cartel, or even a greater sense of regret in the German companies linked to their 
religious beliefs (population predominantly, in equal measure, Catholic or Protestant). 
However, this latter interpretation does not seem very plausible if these companies 
would have taken part in the infringement for a long period of time. In fact, in the EU, 
more than 80% of German companies, main cooperating partners in detecting the 
infringement, participate for more than two years in the corresponding cartels that were 
fined. In Spain, a Spanish subsidiary of the group Henkel AG Co KgaA that blew the 
whistle participated in those denounced cartels for a period of not less than 27 months.66 
 
IV.II. Measuring the effectiveness of competition policy following the introduction of a leniency program 
Measuring objectively the effectiveness of competition policy is a very difficult task. 
However, in recent years a number of indicators have been developed which amount to 
good proxy variables for estimating the effectiveness of competition policy. Thus three 
large sources of data along this line exist: the Global Competition Review, those provided by 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) from Davos and those from the IMD Business School 
in Lausanne (International Institute for Management Development). 
In 2012, the first indicator performs an annual survey of professionals involved in 
competition policy and regulations in 34 countries. Both the World Economic Forum and 
the IMD Business School conduct a survey of business directors on a wide range of 
issues related to the competitiveness of the countries in which they operate and that are 
taken into account in the development of the Global Competitiveness Report67 and the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook68 rankings respectively, and published annually by each of these 
institutions. 
More specifically, the Executive Opinion Survey from the IMD Business School in Lausanne 
includes the following statement to business directors: “competition law is effective in 
                                                        
65 Guzmán, C. 2012. El “programa de clemencia” en el sistema español de defensa de la competencia: una 
visión práctica. Working Paper IE Law School, AJ8-188. 
66 CNC, file S/0085/08 Dentríficos, resolution December 10, 2009, file S/0084/08 Fabricantes de gel, 
resolution January 1, 2010 and file S/0086/08 Peluquería professional, resolution March 2, 2011. 
67 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report. 
68 IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
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preventing anticompetitive practices”69, that had to be answered on a scale depending on 
the degree of agreement or disagreement with that statement. Although somewhat 
generic, Voigt70 shows that the average response to this statement on a country and 
yearly basis is highly correlated with other similar indicators including that of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), which makes it into a proxy for the perception of the effectiveness 
of the country’s competition legislation on the part of the company executives. It has 
also been used in many references such as Dutz and Hayri,71 Borrell and Jiménez,72 
Voigt,73 Waked74 or Ma,75 among others. 
The descriptive analysis of the effectiveness indicator allows us to intuitively show how 
the effectiveness of the competition policy changes over time in the different countries 
studied. The situation in Spain highlights how the effectiveness indicator of competition 
policy rose by 30% after the new competition law came into force in 2007 and reached a 
peak in 2011. 
The creation of the Comisión Nacional de Competencia in 2007, endowed with greater 
independence and resources to investigate and resolve cases, the improvement in the law 
and its application in different fields like the leniency programme, the application of 
more justified and severe penalties, and better coordination in the application of the law 
with regional competition authorities have been an excellent basis for real convergence in 
effectiveness of the competition policy in relation to countries that are a benchmark in 
this field in Europe, such as Germany, Austria, Denmark and Finland. 
                                                        
69 IMD, the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Competitiveness Yearbook. 
70 Voigt S. 2009. The effect of competition policy on development: Cross-country evidence using four new 
indicators. Journal of Development Studies, 45(8), 1225-1248. 
71 Dutz, M.A. and Hayri A. 2000. Does more intense competition lead to higher growth? World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, 2320 and CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2249. 
72 Borrell and Jiménez (fn 26). 
73 Voigt (fn 73). 
74 Waked, D.I. 2010. Antitrust enforcement in developing countries: reasons for enforcement & non-
enforcement using resource-based evidence. 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. 
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638874 
75 Ma, T.-C. 2011. The effect of Competition Law enforcement on economic growth. Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, 7, 301-334; Ma, T.-C. 2012. Legal tradition and antitrust effectiveness. 




Figure 6. Effectiveness of competition policy in Spain and reference countries 
100 = Best country each year 
Finland 2006, 2010 and 2011, Austria 2007, and Denmark 2008, 2009 and 2012 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Executive Opinion Survey of the IMD Business 
School. 
 
The database that the IMD Business School has furnished to the authors contains 
information from 1998 to 2011 for a panel of countries, specifically between 46 in 1998 
and 63 in 2012. Table 7 shows the mean effectiveness values of the competition policy 
by country, dealing separately with the values for pairs of countries and years, as well as 
the distinction between those in which the leniency programme is in force, and those in 
which it is not. The average difference is important, at around 10%. 
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Table 7. Analysis of the mean index values of effectiveness of competition policy 




Mean value of 
effectiveness 
WITH Leniency 







5,26 (1,28) 5,85 (1,15) 0,58 (0,09)*** 11,22% 0,26*** 
Source: Borrell, Jiménez and García (2014). The entire sample between 1998 and 2011. 730 pairs 
of countries and years. 
Note: Significance test *** 1%. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
However, the results in the table above do not take into account possible selection bias: 
leniency policy is not adopted in a random manner as if we were in a clinical trial in 
which the subjects are divided into a treatment group and a control group to estimate the 
effectiveness of a new drug. 
With this in mind, Borrell, Jiménez and García76 carry out a causality analysis based on 
both the estimation in differences and matching methodology hence controlling the 
simultaneous effects of variables such as income per capita, entry to the European 
Union, etc., and thus minimising the bias included in the descriptive analysis. The final 
results of the paper point out that the effectiveness of competition varied positively for 
the sample analysed at between 10 and 21 per cent, underpinning the success of this 
measurement in the promotion of competition. 
Figure 7 includes the cumulative distribution of effectiveness of competition policy, 
spreading between countries with and without leniency programmes. As we can see, the 
effectiveness of competition policy improves for the whole distribution with the 
introduction of the leniency programmes (see orange line). The improvement in the 
effectiveness is greater for countries with medium or medium high levels of effectiveness 
while it is lower or almost zero for countries with very low levels or where the level is 
already very high before the introduction of the leniency policy (ie, the graphical 
difference between green and orange lines is higher when antitrust effectiveness is in the 
range 4.5-6.5). 
 
                                                        
76 Borrell, Jiménez and García (fn 20). 
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Figure 7.- Improvement in effectiveness of competition policy owing to 
introduction of leniency programme 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Borrell, Jiménez and García (2014). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The principle that thieves have no honour is, as we have seen, the basis for the success 
of the leniency programmes adopted in many countries in the world. Leniency 
programmes precisely offer incentives for collaboration with the Competition 
Authorities through complete or partial exemption from sanctions for those companies 
that, having participated in a cartel, decide to provide supporting evidence of the 
administrative or criminal offences against competition in those that they have taken 
part. 
The process of adopting the leniency programmes in competition laws in a growing 
number of jurisdictions follows a diffusion curve that shows how the countries are 
sensitive to the experience of modernisation in public policy that is observed in 
neighbouring countries. 
The good results from these programmes point to an improvement of the perceived 
effectiveness of the leniency programme by business executives to between 10 and 21%. 
As far as the European Union is concerned, the detection and prosecution of the cartels 
in recent years cannot be understood without referring to the leniency programmes that 
have provided 47% of the European Commission’s sanction decisions (art. 101 and 102 
TFUE) over the last 10 years. 
Although the effectiveness of competition policy has improved after the entrance of the 
leniency programme in Spain (and also in all countries where this mechanism has been 
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implemented), the Spanish Competition Authority has not reached the aforementioned 
figures from the European Commission, with the number of cartel cases brought about 
by the leniency programme at 20% of sanction decisions (art.1, 2 and 3 LDC) for the 
period between 2008 and 2013. Bearing in mind that the introduction of the Spanish 
leniency programme has been relatively recent as compared to what happened in the 
European Union and other countries, and the relatively more limited means available to 
the Spanish Competition Authority, this data may be considered a very good 
achievement and suggests for an encouraging future in the programme's implementation. 
Nevertheless, our study has also pointed out some controversial issues in the application 
of the Spanish leniency programme that affect its effectiveness. In particular, we point 
out that the judgements of the competent Spanish Courts do not always tally with the 
Spanish Competition Authority’s decisions in relation to what is understood by being a 
cartel. These differences in interpreting the Spanish Competition Law have led the 
Courts to amend and even repeal several Competition Authority decisions. Legal 
certainty, transparency and predictability in the context of a leniency programme are 
essential for its proper and successful functioning. 
All of these reasons lead us to conclude that there is still considerable scope for 
improvement in the application and effectiveness of the Spanish leniency programme 
and, in this way, strengthen the supporting role that this programme performs in the 
activity of the Spanish Competition Authority. If it succeeds in confronting these 
appropriate changes, and the rest of the institutional reforms concerning regulation and 
competition that have taken place in Spain do not rupture the line of continuous 
improvements achieved in the past seven years, the leniency programme is destined to be 
the main source of detecting and sanctioning cartels in this country in the next decade. 
 
